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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY1
Lithium‟s potential as a key ingredient in the new generation
of electric car batteries has raised international interest. It is
the lightest metal on the planet and used in most electronic
equipments and advance batteries. Lithium is also used in
ceramics and glass production, bi-polar medication, air
conditioners, lubricants, nuclear weaponry, and other
products.
The world‟s largest lithium mining company predicted that
in the near future 10 percent of all new cars - close to 5
million vehicles per year - would be powered by lithium-ion
batteries. It also predicted that this rate would rise to 20
percent by 2020. Given existing, known supplies, this means
that the world could run out of lithium, a non-renewable
resource, in 2020.
Powerful multinational corporations plan to invest billions in
future lithium production. Some industry predictions
estimate that lithium car battery sales could jump ten-fold
from $100 million to $103 billion per year over the next two
decades. If such investments take place, countries that
possess lithium, like Bolivia, and are willing to export it
could become important suppliers in the global economy.
The largest lithium reserve bases are found in Argentina,
Bolivia and Chile. Bolivia‟s lithium reserves are estimated
at between 5.5 and 8.9 million tons and ranked among the
largest in the world. They are found in the beautiful Salar de
Uyuni (Uyuni Saltpan), a 3,860 square mile high-desert
(Altiplano) area of salt-embedded minerals in the Bolivian
Andes located in the country‟s southwestern Potosí
Department, bordering Chile‟s Atacama Dessert.
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The concentration of lithium varies widely in different parts
of the Salar de Uyuni. Production may focus on small areas.
Much of the lithium could remain inaccessible or would take
decades to extract.
Considering the real grade and
distribution of lithium in the Uyuni, the deposits may not be
a particularly attractive resource and the real exploitable
reserve could be only approximately 300,000 tons rather than
the estimated millions. In 2009, a pilot operation was
initiated in the Salar de Uyuni to determine the technical and
economic feasibility of mining and refining the lithium-rich
brine. Results from this effort should provide significant
insights into the potential value of Bolivian lithium deposits.
Bolivia will have to invest heavily over the next few years in
order to produce lithium carbonate for export. It is virtually
inevitable that Bolivia will have to seek partnerships with
foreign companies in 2010 and beyond to obtain badly
needed capital and technology. It remains to be seen if the
current administration of President Evo Morales (2006present) will be able to take advantage of growing market
demands for lithium or the opportunity will be left for future
Bolivian governments.
President Morales is attempting to change the past patterns
of foreign exploitation by asserting national control of
Bolivia‟s huge natural gas reserves and its massive lithium
deposits. To date, his government has maintained strict state
control of the country‟s lithium resources and limited foreign
access and investment. Also, several of Bolivia‟s indigenous
organizations, active in the Salar de Uyuni region, have
demanded a “fair” share in the eventual bounty to be reaped
from future lithium exploitation. As a result, mining of
Bolivian lithium reserves will depend for now on the
capacity of the Morales administration to negotiate and
balance the benefits of all the stakeholders vs. his own
political agenda.
2

Since 2006, foreign corporations and governments have
lobbied the Bolivian government for access to the lithium
riches. Among them, Japanese automakers, Brazil, Canada,
French electric car maker, Bolloré, and others. In 2009,
COMIBOL signed a Memorandum of Understanding with
Korean Resources Corporation and with the French Bolloré
Group. Also in 2009, during the visit of Iran‟s President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to La Paz, an agreement reached
committed Iran to assist Bolivia on conducting lithium
research. Iranian experts will join Brazil's Ministry of
Science and researchers from companies such as France's
Eramet SA and Bolloré SA, to hold a joint study on the
lithium reserves. Bolivia‟s current tensions with Washington
have effectively left American companies on the sidelines as
other foreign enterprises continue to actively negotiate
lithium deals in Bolivia.
Serious potential environmental problems stemming from
lithium mining in Bolivia cannot be ignored. The
ecologically fragile Salar de Uyuni could become an
environmental disaster, if sufficient precautions are not
taken. Also, lithium development could seriously damage
two key industries in the region – agriculture and tourism.
The Salar de Uyuni, the brightest spot on earth as seen from
space is an area of outstanding natural beauty. More than
60,000 tourists visit the area every year. The ecosystem as
well as the tourist industry in the area could be seriously
compromised in the search for lithium.
Finally, the chronic institutional deficiencies and lack of
stability of the Bolivian state pose serious questions
regarding its capacity to manage an ambitious lithium
development
program.
Problems
of
inadequate
administrative capacity within the Bolivian government
clearly antedate the current Morales administration
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INTRODUCTION
As the world seeks energy alternatives and the efficient ways
to use and store it, Bolivia has been thrown into the limelight
as the country with the largest estimated lithium reserve
base.
Lithium is the lightest metal and coveted in the
production of electric cars batteries and electronic
equipment. Foreign corporations and governments alike have
been lobbying the Bolivian government for access to its
lithium riches. Yet, Bolivia faces daunting challenges in
developing the lithium from its huge reserve base. The most
significant of these challenges are as follows:
1. Need to invest heavily over the next few years to
produce lithium for export.
2. Lack of technical and managerial capabilities to
develop the lithium on its own.
3. A pattern of nationalization of natural resources
which scares away investors with the required
know how and capacity to develop the lithium.
4. The Morales government hesitation in choosing
partners.
5. Geological assessment of the grade and
distribution of lithium that indicate that the
concentration of lithium varies widely and
production would concentrate in small areas.
Most of the lithium could remain inaccessible,
not be economical, or would take decades to
extract.
6. The risks of environmental damage to the Salar
de Uyuni ecosystem and to surrounding
communities could surpass benefits of lithium
extraction.
Largely because of internal political tensions and
nationalism, Bolivia continues in 2010 to vacillate regarding
how best to tap its lithium reserves. This delay has permitted
4

nations with smaller reserves, like Chile and China, to step
up to meet growing world demands for lithium. Yet,
geologists and economists are unsure whether world lithium
reserves outside of Bolivia are enough to meet exploding
global demand, although some are convinced that accessible
lithium resources are significantly larger than estimated by
the United States Geological Survey. If true, Bolivia‟s
current window of opportunity to exploit its lithium could
eventually be eclipsed by lithium finds in other regions or by
the emergence of new, alternative technological
breakthroughs that do not rely on lithium at all. As Bolivian
economist Juan Carlos Zuleta claims: "We have the most
magnificent lithium reserves on the planet, but if we don't
step into the race now, we will lose this chance. The market
will find other solutions."2
This paper looks at the uses of lithium, the geological
assessments that have been made of the Bolivian lithium
reserves and the implications for both Bolivia and for the
United States in terms of the decisions that Bolivia will make
on how best to exploit its potential richness. It also offers
some conclusions and recommendations in the context of US
security interests. An appendix provides a brief synopsis of
the Morales government.
THE DEMAND FOR LITHIUM
Lithium‟s use as a key ingredient in the new generation of
electric car batteries has raised international interest. It is the
lightest metal on the planet and used in most electronic
equipments and advance batteries. As of 2007, 60 percent of
the world‟s cell phones and some 90 percent of laptops
contained lithium batteries and the percentages continue to
2

Jason Mick, “Tensions Soar Among Industrialized Nations Over
Bolivia‟s Lithium Supplies,” Daily Tech, Feb. 6, 2009,
http://www.dailytech.com/Tensions+Soar+Among+Industrial+Nations+
Over+Bolivias+Lithium+Supply/ article14173.htm.
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rise each year. Lithium is also used in ceramics and glass
production, bi-polar medication, air conditioners, lubricants,
nuclear weaponry, and other products.3
Powerful multinational corporations plan to invest billions in
future lithium production. Some industry predictions
estimate that lithium car battery sales could jump ten-fold
from $100 million to $103 billion per year over the next two
decades. If such investments take place, countries that
possess lithium, like Bolivia, and are willing to export it
could become important suppliers in the global economy. 4
Despite the enthusiasm, there are also concerns about lithium
batteries on both the economic, technical, and environmental
fronts. The process for transforming lithium into its
commercially valuable form, lithium carbonate, remains
complex and expensive. The electrical vehicle batteries
currently being developed with lithium are still too large and
heavy and charge too slowly. The batteries are so expensive
that they push the cost of electricity-driven cars beyond the
reach of most consumers, although lithium accounts for less

3

Lithium use worldwide by volume in 2007 broke down as follows:
Polymer 4%; Chemical Process 3%; Battery 25%; Air-conditioning 6%;
Lubricant 12%; Glass 8%; Ceramics 10%; Aluminum 4%; Continuous
Casting 3%; Pharmaceutical 3%; Others 22%, in Brian W. Jaskula,
“Lithium,” Washington DC: US Geological Survey (USGS), 2007.
4
Rory Carroll and Andres Schipani, “Multinationals eye lithium reserves
beneath Bolivia‟s salt flats,” The Guardian, June 17, 2009; Stephen
Markley, “Will Lithium-Air Battery Be the Silver Bullet?” The Miami
Herald, May 07, 2010. Demand for lithium has skyrocketed over the last
five years as manufacturers of batteries for BlackBerrys, iPods and other
electronic devices have increasingly relied on the mineral. It is, however,
the automobile industry that looms as the largest potential consumer of
lithium over the next decade and beyond, because lithium batteries would
allow electric cars to store more energy and be driven longer distances
than the heavier nickel batteries.
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than five percent of the estimated cost of battery today. 5
Lithium batteries also have a record of catching fire. So
while lithium car batteries might become a massive global
market in the future, they could also fizzle. 6
Environmental studies claim that mass production of lithium
carbonate is not environmentally sound. The Meridian
International Research, for example, has concluded that, “it
could cause irreparable ecological damage to ecosystems that
should be protected and that Lilon propulsion is
incompatible with the notion of the “Green Car.”7
Yet, in 2007, SQM, the world‟s largest lithium mining
company predicted that in the near future 10 percent of all
new cars - close to 5 million vehicles per year - would be
powered by lithium-ion batteries. It also predicted that this
rate would rise to 20 percent by 2020. Based on such
predictions, the demand for battery-grade lithium carbonate
would rise from 85,000 tons per year in 2007 to 160,000 tons
per year in 2015. Given existing, known supplies, this means
that the world would run out of lithium, a non-renewable
resource, in 2020. In that context, some experts belief that
depletion rates of lithium could exceed current oil depletion
rates and switch dependency from one diminishing resources
to another.8 These forecasts, however, depend on unreliable
forecasts of increasing production of electric vehicles and do
5

Interview with Jay Chmelauskas, President, Western Lithium Canada
Corporation, in Jon Knox, “All Set to Power New Generation Lithium
Batteries,” Automotive Industries, March 22, 2009.
6
Simon Romero, “In Bolivia, Untapped Bounty Meets Nationalism,” The
New York Times, February 3, 2009; Christine Negroni, “Lithium Battery
Risks Draw Scrutiny,” The New York Times, October 27, 2009, Saqib
Rhaim, “Will Lithium-Air Battery Rescue Electric Car Drivers from
'Range Anxiety‟?” The New York Times, May 7, 2010.
7
Meridian International Research, “The Trouble with Lithium 2: Under
the Microscope,” Le Legers, France, 29 May 2008, pp.1.
8
William Tahil, “The Trouble with Lithium,” Meridian International
Research, December 2006, pp. 1.

7

not take into consideration technological changes that would
affect content of lithium in batteries and suspected lithium
reserves in un-surveyed regions, such as Africa. At the
moment, lithium seems to be abundant and inexpensive. 9
The United States is the main importer of lithium materials
and compounds and the leading producer of value-added
lithium materials. In 2009, the US Department of Energy
funded US$2.4 billion in grants to accelerate the
development of US manufacturing capacity for batteries and
electric-drive components and for the deployment of electricdrive vehicles. The grants are designed to launch an
advanced battery industry in the United States.10
LITHIUM RESERVES AND PRODUCTION
Lithium reserves are contained in five raw natural mineral
forms: Continental Brines, Pragmatites, Hetolites, Oil Filed
Brines and Geothermal Brines, having the first one the
richest contain of lithium. Experts disagree on availability of
lithium reserves. The US Geological Survey, for example,
indicates that lithium resources total 2.5 million tons in the
United States and approximately 23 million tons in other
countries, mainly Bolivia, Chile, Argentina and China.11 It
also predicts that that there are still huge supplies of lithium
that remain untapped world-wide.12

9

Toby Procter, “How long will Lithium last?” BLOG, 20 April 2009,
http://www.climatechangecorp./content.asp.
10
Brian W. Jaskula, “Lithium,” in U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral
Commodity Summaries, January 2010, pp.92-93.
11
Ibid. pp. 93.
12
Jaskula, “Mineral Commodities Summaries,” Washington DC: U.S.
Geological Survey, January 2009; and Keith Johnson, “Peak Lithium:
Will Supply Fears Drive Alternative Batteries?” Environmental Capital,
February 3, 2009.
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The largest lithium reserve bases are found in Argentina,
Bolivia and Chile.13 Nearly 80 percent of the known global
lithium reserve base is located in the “The Lithium
Triangle,” an area bordered by the three large South
American salt flats: The Salar de Atacama in Chile, the
Salar de Uyuni in Bolivia, and the Salar del Hombre Muerto
in Argentina. In 2005-2008, the United States imported 63
percent of its lithium needs from Chile.14
The largest known lithium reserves in North America are
found in the near surface lithium clay deposit located in the
State of Nevada. This is the main domestic supplier for the
United States. The deposits are being mined by Canada‟s
Western Lithium Corporation. An estimated 11 million
tones of lithium carbonate equivalent are located within five
mineralized near surface zones. Just one of the five zones
could produce 20,000 tons a year, or approximately one-fifth
of the world production.15

13

The Reserve Base is the part of the identified resource that meets
specified minimum physical and chemical criteria related to current
mining and production practices. It is a rather nebulous figure. Only
“reserves” should be considered available at the moment, of which
Bolivia is yet to be determined, in Tahil, opp cit. “The Trouble with
Lithium,” pp. 4.
14
Jaskula, opp. cit.
15
Interview with Jay Chmelauskas, President, Western Lithium Canada
Corporation, opp. cit.
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Global Lithium Production and Reserves
Country
Production 2008
Reserves16
Meter Tons
Chile
10,600
7,500,000
Australia
6,280
580,000
China
3,290
540,000
Argentina
3,170
800,000
United States
1,000
38,000
Canada
690
180,000
Portugal
700
-Zimbabwe
500
23,000
Brazil
160
190,000
Bolivia
-Source: US Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries, January
2010

Chile is the world‟s largest producer and exporter of lithium
carbonate. Chilean lithium is being mined by Chemetall, a
subsidiary of the New Jersey-based Rockwood Holdings
Inc., and Soquimich (SQM), a Chilean state-owned
company. Together they produce seventy percent of all
lithium carbonate from Chile‟s lucrative Salar de Atacama.
With an output of 40,000 metric tons of lithium carbonate
per year, Chile currently supplies a third of the global
market. Estimates of Chile‟s remaining lithium reserves
range from 3 million to 7.5 million tons. Chile‟s lithium
reserves are also among the purest in the world and Chile‟s
easy access to sea transport helps keep its total production
costs low.17
Australia, China, Argentina and the United States follow
Chile as the largest producers of lithium. Serbia and Finland
also produce lithium. Large deposits exist in several other
16

The US Geological Survey discontinued reserve base estimates in
2009.
17
Sean Goforth, “Argentina, Bolivia and Chile: The ABCs of Lithium,”
World Politics Review, 01 Apr 2010.
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countries but production is low due to the high cost of
extraction. These limitations mean that the future of the
world‟s lithium supplies remains uncertain and may be
insufficient to meet potential future demand.
BOLIVIA’S LITHIUM
With governments around the globe (including the United
States) demanding increased fuel efficiency to reduce their
dependence on imported oil, private foreign corporations are
keenly pursuing access to Bolivia‟s lithium. Bolivia‟s
lithium reserves are estimated at 5.5 million tons. 18 Some
analysts believe that the reserves could be as high as 8.9
million tons, the largest in the world. The reserve base is
found principally in the Salar de Uyuni (Uyuni Saltpan), a
3,860 square mile high-desert (Altiplano) area of saltembedded minerals in the Bolivian Andes located in the
country‟s southwestern Potosí Department, bordering Chile‟s
Atacama Dessert.19 The beautiful Salar de Uyuni is the
largest salt flat in the world and the brightest object on the
Earth‟s surface visible from space. Many experts believe that
efficient exploitation of Bolivia‟s lithium deposits could
substantially increase present world supplies.

18

Jaskula, “Lithium.”
Juan Carlos Zuleta, “El enorme potencial de litio de Bolivia,” La Paz,
Bolivia: Hora 25, No. 69, Nov. 18-Dec.2, 2009.
19
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Map of Bolivia

There is no definite data on Bolivia‟s lithium reserves. TRU
Group, a lithium consulting firm, indicates that harvesting
and processing lithium from the large Salar de Uyuni is a
difficult and tricky task. TRU argues that further strategic
deep drilling exploration is required before the real potential
of Bolivia‟s to produce lithium carbonate for batteries is
determined.20
The French Meridian Research group also believes that
estimates of the concentration of lithium vary widely in
different parts of the Salar. Production would concentrate in
20

TRU Group Inc., “Development of the World‟s Largest Lithium
Brine,” Uyuni Lithium Brine Salar Resource Bolivia Development,
http://trugroup.com/Uyuni-lithium.html.
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small areas. Most of the lithium could remain inaccessible
or would take decades to extract.21 The Meridian Research
Reports that:
The structure of the Salar de Uyuni is very
different to the Salar de Atacama
(Chile)….Whereas the brine containing halite
layer in the Salar de Atacama is 35 meters
thick, the Uyuni halite deposit is very
thin…The halite is…porous all the way
through, with a much higher porosity of 35%
and is filled with interstitial brine. This
means that the quality of lithium available per
unit surface is much lower and a
correspondingly greater area of the Salar will
have to be exploited for an equivalent lithium
production.22
The report concludes that, considering the real grade and
distribution of lithium in the Uyuni, its lithium might not be
a particularly attractive resource and that the real exploitable
reserve could be only approximately 300,000 tons rather than
the estimated millions. Also, the available methods for
mining could be highly environmentally damaging. 23
The current Bolivian government of President Evo Morales
(2006-present) has put forward a general plan for the
development of its lithium deposits, but the specific details
of how Bolivia‟s lithium will be mined, by whom and under
what terms have not yet been clarified. In March 2008, the
Morales government issued a decree investing $5.7 million
to set up a state owned “pilot extraction plant” at the edge of
the Salar de Uyuni. The plant is operated by a “General
Directorate of Evaporative Resources of the Salar de Uyuni,”
21

Meridian International Research, “The Trouble with Lithium 2,” pp.13.
Ibid, pp. 13.
23
Ibid, pp. 14.
22
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under the state mining company COMIBOL (Corporación
Mineral de Bolivia). Drilling started in August 2009. 24
The pilot plant is intended to determine the technical and
economic feasibility of getting the lithium-rich brine out
from under the Salar‟s crust and separating it into its distinct,
marketable products. Building on the experience of this pilot
plant, the Morales government intends to construct a much
larger industrial-scale plant capable of producing up to
30,000 to 40,000 metric tons of lithium carbonate per year. A
third phase, in which marketable lithium compounds will be
produced in association or partnership with foreign investors,
will then follow.25
The costs involved in making the Bolivian lithium industry
operational will be very high. Current estimates suggest that
it could cost at least $200 million just to make the main plant
operational. Substantial additional investments to support
needed chemical industries and substantial infrastructure
development in the Salar de Uyuni - still a remote and
largely undeveloped region of the country - would also be
required at a price of at least U.S. $1 billion or more. In light
of both the costs and the technological problems involved,
Bolivia is exploring partnerships with foreign investors, a
strategy that some local community groups and many
Bolivian nationalists do not support.26

24

Ibid, pp. 14.
John M. Broder, “U.S. Issues Limits on Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from Cars,” The New York Times, April 1, 2010; and Rebecca Hollender
and Jim Schultz, “Bolivia and its Lithium: Can the „Gold of the 21st
Century‟ Help Lift a Nation out of Poverty?” Cochabamba, Bolivia: A
Democracy Center Special Report, The Democracy Center, May 2010,
pp. 24-25.
26
Ibid, pp. 34-36; and Romero, “In Bolivia, Untapped Bounty Meets
Nationalism.”
25
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CHOOSING A PARTNER
Since 2006, foreign corporations and governments have
lobbied the Bolivian government for access to the lithium
riches. Bolivia has a long, often bitter history of foreign
mining and mineral exports that stretches back to the
exploitation of its legendary Potosí silver mines by the
Spanish during the colonial era. The administration of
President Morales is attempting to change the past patterns
of foreign exploitation by asserting national control of
Bolivia‟s huge natural gas reserves and its massive lithium
deposits.27 To date, the Morales government has maintained
strict state control of the country‟s lithium resources and
limited foreign access and investment. Also, several of
Bolivia‟s indigenous organizations, active in the Salar de
Uyuni region, have demanded a “fair” share in the eventual
bounty to be reaped from future lithium exploitation.28
Among the major international investors interested in
Bolivia‟s lithium are Brazil, Iran, the Japanese companies
Mitsubishi and Sumitomo, South Korea and the French
electric vehicle manufacturer, Bolloré.29 In 2009, COMIBOL
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Korean

27

Hollender and Schultz, “Bolivia and its Lithium,” pp. 3-4; and Barjak,
Frank and Carlos Valdez, “Bolivia Pins Hopes on Lithium, Electric
Vehicles,” Associated Press, February 28, 2009.
28
Romero, “In Bolivia, Untapped Bounty Meets Nationalism;” and
Damian Kahya, “Bolivia holds key to electric car future,” BBC News, 9
November 2009.
29
Carroll and Schpani, “Multinationals eye lithium reserves beneath
Bolivia‟s salt flats.” Demand for lithium carbonate doubled from 2003 to
2007, and the market for lithium-ion batteries may expand to 14 times its
2009 size by 2030. In the shorter term, lithium‟s potential has led Credit
Suisse to expect a 13% rise in sales of lithium-ion (Li-Ion) batteries and a
10% rise in sales of liquid crystal displays (LCD) within a 3–4 year
horizon due to growing demand for portable electronic instruments.
Credit Suisse, “Investment Ideas Bright outlook for lithium-ion batteries
and liquid crystal,” Research Flash, Zurich, 14 October 2009.
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Resources Corporation.30 Also in 2009, during the visit of
Iran‟s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to La Paz, an
agreement reached committed Iran to assist Bolivia on
conducting lithium research.
Iranian experts will join
Brazil's Ministry of Science and researchers from companies
such as France's Eramet SA and Bolloré SA, to hold a joint
study on the lithium reserves.31 The agreement with Iran also
calls for exchange of scientific and technical information,
Iranian training of Bolivian professionals on the subject and
promoting faculty exchanges.
The Iranian-Bolivian
technical commission will also analyze potential for
marketing lithium by-products in Iran and other countries.32
During a previous visit to Bolivia, President Ahmadinejad
also showed interest in Bolivia‟s uranium, although reserves
are considered minimal.
Since September 2009, the French electric car consortium,
Bolloré-Eramet, has been pressing the Morales government
for an agreement. They have satisfied demands placed by the
Morales government proposing an industrialization plan that
is nature-friendly. The plan, “A French-Bolivian Project for
the Well-Being of Bolivians in Harmony with Pachamana
(Mother Earth),” includes establishing an electric
manufacturing plant, a prerequisite of the Morales
administration for investors interested in the Salar de
Uyumi.33 Yet, the Bolivian government has yet to respond to
Bolloré or any other investor. “We want partners, not
30

Simon Moores, “Bolivia/Korea Strike Lithium Deal,” Industrial
Minerals, August 17, 2009; and “French/Bolivia Lithium,” Industrial
Minerals, 10 July 2009.
31
“Iran to Study Bolivia‟s Lithium Reserves,” Press TV, 25 November
2009.
32
Anf-Agencia, “Irán también apoyará el desarrollo de la industria de
litio en Bolivia,” Los Tiempos.com, November 24, 2010.
33
“Francesa Bolloré reitera interés en litio boliviano y pide acelerar
proyecto,” Bolivia: Lo Mejor que Tenemos, 29 April 2010,
http://boliviateamo.blogspot.com/2010/04/francesa-bollore-reiterainteres-en.html.
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patrons,” is President Morales' motto for refusing to accept
offers from the interested investors. As such, mining of
Bolivian lithium reserves will depend for now on the
capacity of the Morales administration to negotiate and
balance the benefits of all the stakeholders vs. his own
political agenda.
INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL OBSTACLES FOR
DEVELOPING BOLIVIAN LITHIUM
It remains to be seen if the Morales administration will be
able to take advantage of growing market demands for
lithium or the opportunity will be left for future Bolivian
governments. After two decades of foreign interest in
Bolivia's reserves, the country's natural resource policies,
regional posture and poor infrastructure have led foreign
investment in lithium mining to increasingly favor Chile and
Argentina in recent years. 34 Bolivia will have to overcome
daunting obstacles before it will be able to export significant
amounts of lithium to international markets.
Key
developmental challenges are outlined below.
LACKING A ROAD M AP
Bolivia does not have yet the technical capacity to achieve
the goals laid out by the Morales administration regarding
exploitation of the country‟s lithium reserves. President
Morales alleges that Bolivia itself will produce electric cars.
There is no clear indication when the electric car will be
fully developed--since the industrial capacity for this type of
complex industrial process is inexistent in the country-- how
big that market will be, and when it will peak. Bolivia could
aim at more traditional lithium markets, such as glass and
ceramics, but demand in these markets is not likely to be as
34

Goforth, “Argentina, Bolivia and Chile: The ABCs of Lithium;” and
Matthew Smith and Matthew Craze, “Lithium for 4.8 Billion Electric
Cars Lets Bolivia Upset Market,” Bloomberg, December 7, 2009.
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profitable. A middle course would be for Bolivia to supply
already proven types of lithium batteries for products such as
watches, cell phones, iPods, laptops and other electronic
devices. No matter which option is finally selected, Bolivia
will have to come up with a clear plan or road map to
maximize the development potential of its lithium reserves.
It does not yet have one.35
INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES
The chronic institutional deficiencies and lack of stability of
the Bolivian state pose serious questions regarding its
capacity to manage an ambitious lithium development
program. Problems of inadequate administrative capacity
within the Bolivian government clearly antedate the current
Morales administration. To undertake lithium development
successfully, the Bolivian state will need trained and
qualified experts in the technical and scientific aspects of
lithium mining, environmental controls, in business and
financial management, as well as in international legal
contracts, social and environmental impact assessments. At
present, those capacities required for effective, professional
development of its lithium resources are not in place.36
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
Serious potential environmental problems stemming from
lithium mining in Bolivia cannot be ignored. Bolivia‟s
ecologically fragile Salar de Uyuni could become an
environmental disaster, if sufficient precautions are not
taken. The adequacy of Bolivia‟s environmental strategy for
lithium development in Southwest Potosí is questioned by
many
Bolivian
and
international
environmental
organizations. Lithium mining could cause a major water
crisis in the Uyuni region, which already suffers from serious
35
36

Hollender and Schultz, “Bolivia and its Lithium,” pp.29-34.
Hollender and Schultz, “Bolivia and its Lithium,” p. 48.
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water shortages that negatively impact the farming, llama
herders, the tourism industry, and drinking water supplies.
While Bolivian officials claim that the national lithium
project‟s water requirements will be minimal, their estimates
are based on only limited and incomplete information.37
Contamination of the air, water and soil is also a potential
concern. Large quantities of toxic chemicals must be used to
process the predicted 30,000 to 40,000 tons of lithium per
year that the project expects to mine. The escape of such
chemicals via spills or air emissions could threaten the
communities in the area and the ecosystem as a whole.
Reports from Chile‟s Salar de Atacama describe a landscape
marred by toxic piles of discarded salt and extensive canals
filled with chemically contaminated water.
Bolivian officials have often minimized such risks in the past
while the institutional systems in place to protect the
environment are inadequate at best. Public institutions, such
as Bolivia‟s Ministry of the Environment and Water, that are
responsible for enforcing compliance with national
environmental regulations and standards, do not have the
professional expertise, technical capabilities or legal
authority to intervene effectively. 38
THREATS TO BOLIVIA’S RURAL COMMUNITIES AND
TOURISM
Some groups and communities in the region openly endorse
lithium development as an opportunity for increased income
and development. But there are also groups with serious
objections that oppose such development. Quinoa producers
and tourism operators have repeatedly expressed concerns
37
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about the benefits that the Bolivian government has
promised from lithium on the grounds that the supposed
benefits would not meet local needs. Moreover, lithium
development could seriously damage two key industries in
the region – agriculture and tourism. Bolivia‟s laws
guaranteeing community participation are as weak as its
environmental protections.39
The Salar de Uyuni, often classified as a natural wonder of
the world, is an area of outstanding natural beauty.
Flamingos breed in the lagoon created over the Salar during
the summer rains. More than 60,000 tourists visit the area
every year. The ecosystem as well as the tourist industry in
the area could be seriously compromised in the search for
lithium.40
BOLIVIA -U.S RELATIONS
US relations with Bolivia under the administration of
President Morales have been tense and antagonistic.
President Morales has consistently opposed free-trade
policies advocated by the United States and adamantly
refused to negotiate with the U.S.-sponsored regional
Andean free trade agreement, as did Ecuador and Venezuela.
The US has been concerned about rising Bolivian coca
cultivation. Bolivia is the world's third largest producer of
coca leaf, the raw material used to manufacture cocaine.
Crop-eradication programs in the 1990s and early 2000s,
funded by the US, incensed many of Bolivia's poorest
farmers – mainly Morales supporters - for whom coca is
often their only source of income. A former coca farmer
himself, Morales tolerant policies towards coca cultivation
for traditional and medicinal uses has progressively

39
40
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worsened U.S.-Bolivian bilateral relations since 2006.41
close alliance between the Morales administration
Venezuela‟s President Hugo Chavez has also made
Bolivian government antagonistic to US policies in
region.

The
and
the
the

In 2008, Washington suspended most U.S. drug control
funding for Bolivia and recalled Ambassador Philip
Goldberg for “consultations”. President Morales also took
actions against the U.S. He expelled the U.S. Agency for
International
Development
(USAID)
alternative
development workers from the Chapare coca growing
region.42 He formally expelled Ambassador Goldberg, after
accusing him of meddling in Bolivia‟s internal affairs. Soon
after, the US government temporarily suspended Peace
Corps operations in Bolivia. Washington followed by
declaring that Bolivia had “failed” to uphold its international
counterdrug obligations, although President George W. Bush
did grant Bolivia a “national security waiver” so that U.S.
assistance would not automatically be cut off. President
Bush also suspended Bolivia‟s U.S. trade preferences under
the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act
(ATPDEA), again citing Bolivia‟s failure to adhere to antinarcotics commitments. In November 2008, Morales ordered
the U.S Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) out of Bolivia.43
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The Obama administration maintained Bolivia‟s suspension
from APTDEA in 2009 and again in 2010. In early June
2010, however, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs, Arturo Valenzuela, traveled to La Paz
to re-start talks on a bilateral framework agreement that
could lead to the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations
between the two countries within the year.44
BOLIVIA’S LITHIUM GAMBLE
The strains in U.S.-Bolivian bilateral relations have not
dampened efforts by non-U.S. foreign corporations to court
the Bolivian government. U.S. companies, however, do seem
to have been disadvantaged by the recurrent tensions in
bilateral relations. But even non-U.S.-based foreign
companies seeking to tap Bolivia‟s lithium reserves have had
to navigate carefully around Morales‟ resource nationalism.
Indeed, President Morales has clashed repeatedly with
American, European and even South American investors. In
2006 Morales shocked Brazil by nationalizing Petrobras‟
(Brazil‟s state-owned petroleum company) natural gas
projects in Bolivia and then demanding a sharp rise in the
prices paid by the Brazilians for Bolivia‟s natural gas. He
carried out further nationalizations just before the 2009 vote
on the Constitution by sending Bolivian soldiers to occupy
the operations of the British oil giant BP. 45
Bolivia will have to invest heavily over the next few years in
order to produce lithium carbonate for export. With world
economic growth slowed as a result of the 2008-09 global
recession, it remains unclear how Bolivia will be able to
44
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make such investments on its own.46 Given domestic realities
and international circumstances, it is virtually inevitable that
Bolivia will have to seek partnerships with foreign
companies in 2010 and beyond to obtain badly needed
capital and technology. Bolivia‟s current tensions with
Washington have effectively left American companies on the
sidelines as other foreign enterprises continue to actively
negotiate lithium deals in Bolivia.47
Yet, largely because of internal political tensions and
nationalism, Bolivia continued in 2010 to vacillate regarding
how best to tap its lithium. This hesitation has permitted
nations with smaller reserves to step up to meet growing
world demand for lithium. Chile leads the pack. China has
also emerged as a top lithium producer, tapping reserves
found in a Tibetan salt flat. But geologists and economists
are unsure whether world lithium reserves outside of Bolivia
are enough to meet exploding global demand, although some
are convinced that accessible lithium resources are
significantly larger than estimated by the United States
Geological Survey. If true, Bolivia‟s current window of
opportunity to exploit its lithium riches in the national
interest under advantageous international conditions would
appear to be only a limited one that could eventually be
eclipsed by lithium finds in other world regions or by the
emergence of new, alternative technological breakthroughs
that do not rely on lithium at all.
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CONCLUSIONS
Bolivian lithium does not appear critical in satisfying US
demand. Nor is it clear if Bolivia‟s real reserves could
produce as much lithium as the reserve base indicates or of
desirable quality. Moreover, lithium-carbonate batteries
might not provide the environmentally sound and sustainable
alternative the US seeks to reduce its demand on fossil oil.
Yet, considering the unpredictability of the technological
developments, having access to potential resources is
generally a sound policy.
The perspectives for the Morales administration capacity to
develop its lithium potential, under current conditions, are
not encouraging. Bolivia lacks the technical and managerial
capacity to do so on its own. Also, most experts believe that
Bolivia‟s lithium potential does not match that of its oil and
gas reserves. The Morales administration‟s reluctance to
accept the offers being presented by foreign investors may
result in Bolivia losing an opportunity to profit from the
growing demand for lithium.
Also, investors with the
needed know-how may be reluctant to investing under an
environment charged by recent nationalizations and lack of
assurance of negotiating in a leveled field and under
sustainable conditions.
Yet, countries like Iran may be
approaching Bolivia hoping to have access to its resources
both for industrial or nuclear purposes and thus, the lithium
may become increasingly politicized.
The progressive worsening of US-Bolivian relationship in
recent years, characterized by mutual suspicion and distrust,
presents formidable obstacles to any rapid improvements.
Yet, the Obama administration has indicated a willingness to
strengthen relations with Bolivia. Considering that natural
resources often last longer than governments, despite current
antagonistic relationship, US would be well-served to have a
24

long term policy strategy in dealing with Bolivia and its
resources.
Finally, the United States and the international community
should raise awareness of the environmental risks involved
in tapping lithium and other resources in the unique Salar de
Uyuni.
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APPENDIX
Bolivia under the Morales Government
A nation of statistical extremes, landlocked Bolivia is the
highest and most isolated South American country.
Approximately 60 percent of its 9.9 million (2009)
inhabitants are indigenous, the largest proportion of any
country in the hemisphere. Although rich in mineral and
energy resources, Bolivia ranks among South America's
poorest countries. Wealthy urban elites, mostly of Spanish
ancestry, traditionally dominated economic, social and
political life of the country while the great majority of
Bolivians, mostly low-income subsistence indigenous
peasant farmers, miners, small traders and artisans, had little
or no voice in national affairs.48
Victorious in the presidential campaign of 2005, Evo
Morales is the first full-blooded, Indian president ever
elected in Bolivia.
Morales belongs to an Aymara
impoverished family. He rose to prominence in Bolivian
politics in the 1990s as a champion of the marginalized rural
and urban poor, first as the leader of Bolivia's militant coca
farmers‟ (cocaleros) association and, subsequently, of the
leftist Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party.
The
movements he led were increasingly imbued with
nationalism and heightened ethnic awareness.
In May 2006, President Morales put Bolivia‟s energy
industry under state control. Foreign energy firms were given
six months to sell at least 51 percent of their holdings to the
state and negotiate new contracts or leave the country.
48
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Although vehemently opposed by Bolivian business elites
and foreign oil executives as a radical move, Morales
nationalization was in practice more a renegotiation of terms
with the foreign energy companies than an outright
expropriation. As world energy prices rose in 2006 and
beyond, the country's finances improved dramatically. At the
same time, President Morales allied his government closely
with the leftist, populist and anti-American Venezuelan
President, Hugo Chavez, and adopted an increasingly
critical, public stance toward the United States. 49
In June 2006, Morales‟ MAS party won a decisive majority
in special elections for a new constituent assembly that was
tasked with rewriting the nation‟s constitution. The resulting
draft constitution promised more rights to Bolivia's
indigenous majority and more autonomy to the departments.
It also contained provisions authorizing an incumbent
president to stand for re-election for a second five-year term.
Violent demonstrations by opponents, mainly from the
wealthy elites, ensued and four of the country's richest
regions defiantly declared autonomy in protest. The new
charter was finally approved by more than 60 percent of
Bolivian voters in a referendum held in January 2009. The
passage of the new Constitution shifted political power
toward the highland provinces, where poor, indigenous
voters predominate, and away from the lowlands, where
most of Bolivia's food is grown and where its petroleum and
natural gas reserves are located.50
Talks between Morales‟s congressional backers and the
fragmented opposition ultimately produced a compromise
that modified earlier versions of the proposed new charter.
One of the most polemical articles in the final draft reversed
a plan to allow Morales to run for re-election indefinitely,
49
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limiting him (and future Bolivian presidents) instead to a
single five-year term without the possibility of re-election.
Other, often vaguely worded items among the new
Constitution‟s 411 articles broadened definitions of property
to include communal ownership; allowed Indians to mete out
corporal punishment under their own legal systems; extended
limited autonomy to regional prefects (governors); and
reaffirmed state control over Bolivia‟s ample natural gas
reserves and other resources.51
Opposition leaders, especially in the eastern lowlands,
campaigned vigorously against approval of the proposed new
charter. The Constitution was finally adopted in a
referendum on January 25, 2009, with close to 60% of the
country in favor. The four departments in Bolivia‟s
rebellious eastern lowlands rejected the charter by wide
margins. Despite the intensity of his opposition in the eastern
lowlands, President Morales scored a comfortable win over
his conservative opponents when he stood for re-election in
December 2009, improving on his 2005 majority and
becoming the first incumbent Bolivian president since 1964
to win a second term. His party also won control of both
chambers of congress, though in the lower house it fell just
short of the two-thirds majority needed for constitutional
changes.52
On April 4, 2010, Bolivians went to the polls to elect 500
officials in local and provincial elections, including the
governors of nine departments. The election was seen as a
crucial test of the spreading strength and influence of
President Morales and his MAS party. They won handily. On
51
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May 1, 2010, the Morales government took control of four
privately owned companies that generate electricity. The
companies accounted for more than half of Bolivia‟s
electricity market.53
The key to Morales's success has been his appeal to the 65
percent of Bolivians who identify as indigenous and who see
him as "one of their own". Under Morales, they have
benefited from increased levels social spending, boosted by
high international prices for hydrocarbons and more taxes on
foreign oil and gas companies. Cash payments have been
made to poor families to encourage school attendance. Extra
pension payments have been provided to the elderly and prenatal and post-natal care has been extended to mothers
without access to health care. Some estimates suggest that
the payments reached a quarter of Bolivia's almost 10 million
people in 2010.54
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